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A lottery is a list of mutually exclusive outcomes together with their associated
probabilities of occurrence. Decision making is often modeled as choices between
lotteries and—in typical research on decision under risk—the probabilities are given to
the subject explicitly in numerical form. In this study, we examined lottery decision task
where the probabilities of receiving various rewards are contingent on the subjects’ own
visual performance in a random-dot-motion (RDM) discrimination task, a metacognitive
or second order judgment. While there is a large literature concerning the RDM
task and there is also a large literature on decision under risk, little is known about
metacognitive decisions when the source of uncertainty is visual. Using fMRI with
humans, we found distinct fronto-striatal and fronto-parietal networks representing
subjects’ estimates of his or her performance, reward value, and the expected value (EV)
of the lotteries. The fronto-striatal network includes the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and
the ventral striatum, involved in reward processing and value-based decision-making.
The fronto-parietal network includes the intraparietal sulcus and the ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, which was shown to be involved in the accumulation of sensory
evidence during visual decision making and in metacognitive judgments on visual
performance. These results demonstrate that—while valuation of performance-based
lotteries involves a common fronto-striatal valuation network—an additional network
unique to the estimation of task-related performance is recruited for the integration of
probability and reward information when probability is inferred from visual performance.
Keywords: decision under risk, metacognition, second-order judgment, valuation, medial prefrontal cortex,
striatum, intraparietal sulcus, lateral prefrontal cortex
Introduction
Decision making is often modeled as a choice among lotteries: each lottery is a list
of mutually exclusive outcomes paired with their probabilities of occurrence. A decision
maker might choose between a lottery (0.5, $500; 0.5, $0) representing a 50% chance of
receiving $500 and a 50% chance of receiving nothing, and (0.95, $250; 0.05, $0) a 95%
chance of $250 and a 5% chance of receiving nothing. A central focus of research on
decision making has been to understand how people use and integrate information about
probability and outcome in making decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Behavioral
research indicated that human choices often deviate from the predictions of standard economic
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model (Kahneman and Tversky, 2002). For example, there is
accumulating evidence suggesting that people tend to distort
probability information. Much effort has been dedicated to
modeling such distortion (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992;
Gonzalez and Wu, 1999).
Most neurobiological studies to date have focused on decision
under risk (Knight, 1921) with both probability and value
information given to the subject in explicit form (e.g., Hsu
et al., 2009) or probability learned from sampling experience
(e.g., Fiorillo et al., 2003). The networks recruited are typically
involved in reward processing and valuation (e.g., see Kable
and Glimcher, 2009; Bartra et al., 2013, for review). Midbrain
dopaminergic system and the associated fronto-striatal networks
in particular have also been associated with coding reward
probability (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Volz et al., 2003; Knutson
et al., 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2009; FitzGerald
et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011; for review, see Platt and Huettel,
2008). Reward probability is represented by phasic response,
while risk (variance) is represented by tonic response in the
midbrain dopaminergic neurons and in the ventral striatum
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006). The ventral striatum
and the medial prefrontal cortex have been shown to represent
subjective value of lottery options in both decision under risk
and decision under ambiguity (Levy et al., 2010), suggesting that
these regions are involved in the integration of probability and
outcome information in decision tasks with different levels of
uncertainty.
But there are many sources of uncertainty that we can gamble
on. We can gamble on the weather or the traffic to the airport
and often do so. We can also gamble on our own visual
and motor abilities, a form of metacognition (Fleming et al.,
2012b) or second-order judgment (Barthelmé and Mamassian,
2009).
An evident question is, given that there are many possible
sources of probability, to what extent do the neural substrates
of decision making overlap for tasks differing in source
of probability? One possibility—the common-network
hypothesis—is that probability information from all sources
converges to a common representation and only then is this
probability information combined with value information to
reach a decision. Under this hypothesis, any decision is computed
in the same valuation networks known to represent probability
information in decision tasks with explicitly described lotteries
or lotteries learned from sampling experience (e.g., Platt and
Huettel, 2008; Bartra et al., 2013). Our first goal is to test this
common-network hypothesis.
We constructed lotteries where probabilities of reward
are specified as the chances of success in a well-known
visual discrimination task—the random-dot-motion (RDM)
discrimination task. On each trial the subject saw two lotteries
with binary outcomes each based on a different visual RDM
stimulus and with different monetary rewards assigned. In this
visual lottery decision task, the subject was instructed to choose
the lottery she or he preferred with the understanding that, at
the end of the experiment two of the chosen lotteries would be
randomly selected and realized. To realize a lottery, the subject
performed a one-shot RDM discrimination at it. He or she won
the associated reward for making a correct judgment on dot
motion direction and otherwise nothing.
The unique feature of the visual lottery decision task is
how information about reward probability is obtained. For each
lottery under consideration, it is required that subjects estimated
the probability of making a correct visual judgment in order
to infer reward probability. It is plausible that this task-related
estimation recruits additional networks during valuation of the
visual lotteries. But it is unknown whether the networks recruited
are those identified in previous research concerning the RDM
task as a visual discrimination task.
Convergent evidence points to the involvement of the
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and the lateral prefrontal cortex
(LPFC) in accumulating sensory evidence over time to guide
visual discrimination of dot motion direction (Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002; Heekeren et al., 2006; for reviews, see Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008). This line of work highlights
how the brain arrives at a judgment during the RDM task.
However, unlike performance in the RDM task, what is needed
in our task is an estimate of the probability that the first-order
judgment is correct, a second-order judgment. Interestingly,
research on metacognition has shown these regions represent
second-order judgment of visual and memory performance
(Fleming et al., 2012a; Baird et al., 2013). The rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex has been shown to be more active when
subjects are engaged in metacognitive judgment of performance
in a perceptual decision-making task compared with a control
task (Fleming et al., 2012a). Activity in this region correlates
with subjects’ confidence in their first-order judgment (Hebart
et al., 2014). For memory-related metacognitive judgment,
resting-state fMRI data reveals that the connectivity between
the intraparietal sulcus and the medial prefrontal cortex
correlates with individual difference in behavioral metacognitive
performance (Baird et al., 2013).
Our second hypothesis—the second-order representation
hypothesis—is the claim that the metacognitive probability of
success in carrying out the RDM task is computed in the
PPC-LPFC network, the same network shown to be involved
in both the first-order and second-order judgments of visual
performance. The common-network hypothesis and the second-
order representation hypothesis are logically independent of each
other: one may be false without implications for the other. In this
study, we tested them both.
Materials and Methods
Constructing a Visual Lottery Decision Task
In decision-making under risk, subjects in laboratory
experiments are typically presented with pairs of lotteries
and asked to choose the one they prefer in each pair. If the
probabilities and reward values are explicitly given, the choice
between lotteries is a form of decision under risk (Knight, 1921).
To design a visual task that is mathematically equivalent
to a typical economic lottery, we modified the random-dot
motion (RDM) discrimination task, a well-established paradigm
for studying visual decision-making. In the standard RDM task, a
visual stimulus consisting of a patch of moving dots is presented
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FIGURE 1 | Constructing a visual lottery decision task. (A) Construction of two visual lotteries. The psychometric function (blue curve) describes the
relation between the probability of making a correct judgment on dot motion direction and motion coherence level in the RDM task. Based on the
psychometric function estimated for each subject separately, we can construct pairs of “visual lotteries.” Each lottery corresponds to a RDM stimulus. In
each lottery, we associate correct response with a monetary reward and incorrect response with no reward. In this example, a lottery (0.65,$500) is
equivalent to a RDM stimulus that had 0.11 coherence, while a lottery (0.95,$250) is equivalent to a RDM stimulus with 0.35 coherence. (B) Trial sequence
of the visual lottery task. (C) Design: combinations of reward value and probability in the visual lottery decision task. The values in each lottery pair were
assigned at random, independent of each other, as were the probabilities. The rewards and probabilities of each lottery were also assigned independently.
to subjects. A proportion of dots moved coherently in one
of two possible directions (in our case, up or down), while
the remaining dots moved at random in all possible directions
with equal probability. The subject’s task was to indicate the
direction of coherent dot motion. Correct responses were
rewarded.
The relation between performance (probability of correct
response) and motion coherence level (the proportion of
dots moving coherently in one direction) is illustrated
in Figure 1A. As the coherence level increases, the
probability of making a correct response increases. The
blue curve in the graph represents the psychometric function
estimated from the performance of an actual subject in this
experiment.
Since the subjects receive a reward for making a correct
response, the probability of a correct response is the probability
of reward (p). Performance at chance level is 50% correct; the
range of p is therefore between 0.5 and 1. We manipulated p
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within this range by changing the coherence level. Based on the
psychometric function unique to the subject, for any probability
of reward ranging from 0.5 to asymptotic level of performance,
we could find the motion coherence level that matches it. We also
manipulated the reward value $x given for a correct response.
In the example shown in Figure 1A, the RDM stimulus with
green ring has a coherence level of 0.11 and was equivalent to
a lottery (0.65,$500;0.35,$0) while the RDM stimulus with red
ring has a coherence level of 0.35 and is equivalent to a lottery
(0.95,$250;0.05,$0). We referred to each such pairing of an RDM
stimulus with a reward value as a perceptual lottery. The RDM
stimuli shown here are purely for illustration purposes; they do
not reflect what the subjects actually saw in the experiment.
To reliably estimate the psychometric function for each
subject, we first trained the subject on the standard RDM task
(see Section Session 1 in Procedure). Following the training
session, the subjects came back on the next day to do the visual
lottery decision task. For more details, see Section Session 2 in
Procedure.
Procedure
There were two sessions in the experiment, both carried out in the
MRI scanner. The fMRI results reported in this paper represent
the results from Session 2: the visual lottery decision task. The
two sessions fell within 2 days.
Session 1: Random-dot-motion discrimination task
The goals of this session were to train the subjects to perform
the standard RDM discrimination task in the MRI scanner and
to estimate the psychometric function for the subsequent visual
lottery decision session (Session 2) that was the focus of this
experiment.
In this session, the subjects were engaged in a fixed-duration
version of the RDM task. Each trial started with a fixation cross
at the center of the screen (0.5 s). A small reward value was
selected at random from [1, 2, 4, 8] NTD (1 US$ = 30 National
Taiwan Dollar) and presented beneath the fixation cross. The
subjects were instructed that they would receive the reward if
theymade a correct judgment on dotmotion direction. The RDM
stimulus then appeared for a fixed duration of 3 s. The subjects
were instructed to fixate the cross and use only his/her peripheral
vision to evaluate the RDM stimulus.
The RDM stimulus was followed and replaced by a response
screen. The subjects had up to 2 s tomake a button-press response
to indicate his/her decision on motion direction. A variable
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) (1–7 s uniform distribution in steps
of 1 s) followed after the response and before feedback was
provided. At feedback, the subjects were notified whether his/her
judgment was correct. The feedback was presented for 0.5 s and
was followed by a variable inter-trial interval (ITI; 1–11 s uniform
distribution in steps of 1 s) before the next trial.
There were five runs in the session. Each run consisted of 40
trials. The subjects encountered five possible coherence levels in
each run (0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.4; eight trials per coherence level).
Each coherence level occurred on eight trials in a run and 40 trials
in total across five runs resulting in a total of 200 trials to estimate
the psychometric function.
Session 2: Visual lottery decision task
The decision task was a choice between two visual lotteries.
On each trial, the subjects were successively presented with
two visual lotteries and asked to choose between them. The
example in Figure 1B illustrates the trial sequence. In this
example, the first perceptual lottery presented (L1) is equivalent
to (0.65,$500;0.35,$0), while the second perceptual lottery (L2)
is equivalent to (0.95,$250;0.05,$0). After seeing both lotteries,
a choice screen would appear and the subjects would select the
preferred lottery (L1 or L2) by pressing a button.
After viewing each visual lottery, subjects were not required to
indicate his or her judgment on the direction of dot motion. She
or he had only to indicate which lottery she or he preferred by
pressing one of two buttons. The subjects were told that—at the
end of the experiment—two of the lotteries she or he chose during
the session would be selected at random. For each selected lottery
the subject would execute the RDM task, judging the direction
of motion. If he or she judged successfully, he or she received
the reward value associated with the lottery. The sum of the
winnings from the two lottery attempts was paid to the subject
as a bonus. To maximize his or her expected winnings, for each
lottery under consideration, the subject had to estimate his or her
own probability of making a correct judgment of dot motion—a
second-order judgment—and integrate it with the reward value
associated with a correct performance.
Both the reward value and reward probability associated with
the first lottery (L1) were varied independently of those for the
second lottery (L2). In Figure 1C, we illustrate the lottery design.
Let L1: (p1,$v1) and L2: (p2,$v2). As shown in the figure, there
were four combinations of $v1 and $v2. Each combination had
eight trials in a run. Since there were two levels of p1 (0.65
and 0.8) and four levels of p2 (0.51, 0.65, 0.8, 0.95), we had
eight combinations of p1 and p2. Each combination was repeated
four times in a run. The four possible [$v1,$v2] and the eight
possible [p1,p2] combinations were randomly assigned to the
trials. As a consequence, there were 32 distinct trials in a run.
There were a total of five runs in the session, for a total of 160
trials.
Following the presentation of L2, the choice screen appeared
and subjects had up to 2 s to indicate his/her choice (L1 or L2).
The location of L1 and L2 was randomized across trials. After
making a response, feedback indicating which lottery was chosen
(L1 or L2) appeared for 0.5 s and was followed by an ITI (1–11 s
drawn from a uniform distribution in steps of 1 s) before the next
trial.
Subjects
Twenty-five subjects participated in the experiment. After session
1, each subject’s performance was analyzed. If a subject’s
performance, i.e., percentage of correct response, did not increase
monotonically as a function of motion coherence level, we did
not invite the subject back to the second session. Among the 25
subjects, six subjects participated only in the first session and
did not continue on to the second. Thus, a total of 19 subjects
completed the experiment (10 women, mean age = 24). All
subjects gave written informed consent prior to participation
in accordance with the procedures approved by Taipei Veteran
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General Hospital IRB. Their average earning was 1923 NTD (1
US$= 30 National Taiwan Dollar or NTD).
Stimuli
The task was programmed using the Psychophysics Toolbox in
MATLAB (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The scripts for the RDM
stimuli were obtained from https://www.shadlenlab.columbia.
edu and subsequently modified for the current study. The stimuli
were presented to the subjects through MRI-compatible goggles
(Resonance Technology Inc.). Because the stimuli were presented
through these goggles, we were not able to provide stimulus-
relatedmeasures in terms of visual angle.We thus described them
in pixel size. The screen resolution was set to 800×600 pixels. The
frame rate was 60Hz. The aperture was 112 pixels in diameter. At
stimulus onset, seven dots were presented within the aperture. At
each subsequent frame, a subset of dots moved coherently in one
direction while the others moved randomly. Once a dot moved
out of the aperture, a new dot was drawn at the opposite side of
the aperture. Within each frame, only seven dots were shown.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Imaging data were collected with a 3T MRI scanner (Siemens
Tim Trio) equipped with a 12-channel head array coil. T2*-
weighted functional images were collected using an EPI sequence
(TR = 2 s, TE = 30ms, 33 oblique slices acquired in ascending
interleaved order, 3.4 × 3.4 × 3.4mm isotropic voxels, 64 × 64
matrix in a 220-mm field of view, flip angle 90◦). Each run
consisted of 304 images. T1-weighted anatomical images were
collected using an MPRAGE sequence (TR = 2.53 s, TE =
3.03ms, flip angle= 7◦, 192 sagittal slices, 1×1× 1mm isotropic
voxel, 224× 256 matrix in a 256-mm field of view).
fMRI Preprocessing
The following pre-processing steps were applied using FMRIB’s
Software Library (FSL) (Smith et al., 2004). First, motion
correction was applied using MCFLIRT to remove the effect
of head motion during each run. Second, we applied spatial
smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 8mm. Third,
a high-pass temporal filtering was applied using Gaussian-
weighted least square straight line fitting with σ = 50 s.
Fourth, registration was performed using a two-step procedure.
First, the unsmoothed EPI image that was the midpoint of the
scan was used to estimate the transformation matrix (seven-
parameter affine transformations) from EPI images to the
subject’s high-resolution T1-weighted structural image, with
non-brain structures removed using FSL’s BET (Brain Extraction
Tool). Second, we estimated the transformation matrix (12-
parameter affine transformation) from the high-resolution T1-
weighted structural image with non-brain structures removed to
the standard MNI template brain.
General Linear Models of Bold Response
To analyze fMRI data from Session 2 (visual lottery decision
task), we estimated four general linear models (GLM) of the
BOLD responses and one psychophysiological interaction (PPI)
model using FSL’s FEAT module (fMRI Expert Analysis Tool).
The first two GLMs were used for the whole-brain analyses
(GLM-1 and GLM-2), while GLM-3, GLM-4 and the PPI
model were conducted for region-of-interest (ROI) analyses.
As described in Section Procedure, each trial consisted of two
phases, lottery presentation and choice response (a button-
press response to indicate lottery choice). We focused the GLM
analyses on the lottery presentation phase. The GLMs described
below list the regressors implemented for the modeling of this
phase. They differ only in this phase.
GLM-1
(R1) Indicator function for the duration of lottery presentation
(3 s), (R2) R1 multiplied by the reward probability (p) of the
currently presented lottery, (R3) R1 multiplied by the reward
value ($v) of the currently presented lottery. The contrast of [R1
R2 R3] = [0 1 0] was used to examine the neural correlates of
reward probability of the visual lottery. The contrast of [R1 R2
R3] = [0 0 1] was used to test the neural correlates of reward
value of the visual lottery.
GLM-2
(R1) Indicator function for the duration of lottery presentation
(3 s), (R2) R1 multiplied by the EV of the currently presented
lottery. The contrast of [R1 R2] = [0 1] was used to examine the
neural correlates of EV of the visual lottery.
GLM-3
(R1) Indicator function for the duration of lottery presentation
of L1 (3 s) when the correct motion direction was upward, (R2)
R1 multiplied by the EV of L1 (EVL1), (R3) Indicator function for
the duration of lottery presentation of L1 (3 s) when the correct
motion direction was downward, (R4) R3 multiplied by EVL1,
(R5) Indicator function for the duration of lottery presentation
of L2 (3 s) when the correct motion direction was upward, (R6)
R5 multiplied by the EV of L2 (EVL2), (R7) Indicator function for
the duration of lottery presentation of L2 (3 s) when the correct
motion direction was downward, (R8) R7 multiplied by EVL2.
The contrast of [R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8] = [0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0] was used to test the neural correlates of EV of the visual lottery
when the correct motion was upward, [0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1] was used
to test the neural correlates of EV of the visual lottery when the
correct motion was downward, [0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0] for EV of L1, and
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1] for EV of L2.
GLM-4
(R1) Indicator function for the duration of each lottery
presentation (3 s) when L1 was chosen, (R2) R1 multiplied by
the EV of the currently presented lottery, (R3) Indicator function
for the duration of each lottery presentation (3 s) when L2 was
chosen, (R4) R3 multiplied by the EV of the currently presented
lottery. The contrast of [R1 R2 R3 R4]= [0 1 0 0] was used to test
the neural correlates of EV of the visual lotteries on trials when
the subject chose L1, and [0 0 0 1] for EV of the visual lotteries on
trials when the subjects chose L2.
For the choice phase, we implemented the following three
regressors in all the above GLMs: An indicator function, a
parametric regressor for EVC–EVNC (the difference in EV
between the Chosen and Non-Chosen lotteries) and a parametric
regressor for EVL2–EVL1 (the difference in EV between L2
and L1). For each trial, the duration of these regressors was
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the subject’s reaction time. All the parametric regressors in
the GLMs were z-normalized so as to allow for comparisons
of their beta estimates when necessary. Each regressor in a
GLM was convolved with a canonical gamma hemodynamic
response function. We implemented temporal derivatives of each
regressor in each model as the regressors of no interest. This
implementation often serves as an alternative to slice-timing
correction and is useful to model for non-linear neural and
vascular effects on the timing shift of BOLD response (Calhoun
et al., 2004).
All GLM analyses were carried out in the following steps
(Beckmann et al., 2003). First, BOLD time series were pre-
whitened with local autocorrelation correction. A first-level
FEAT analysis was carried out for each run of each subject.
Second, a second-level fixed-effect (FE) analysis was carried
out for each subject that combined the first-level FEAT results
from different runs using the summary statistics approach.
Finally, a third-level mixed-effect (ME) analysis using FSL’s
FLAME module (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) was
carried out across subjects by taking the FE results from the
previous level and treating subjects as a random effect (Woolrich
et al., 2004). All reported whole-brain results were corrected for
multiple comparisons. We first identified clusters of activation
by defining a cluster-forming threshold of the z statistic. Then,
a family-wise error corrected p-value of each cluster based on its
size was estimated using Gaussian random field theory (Worsley
et al., 1992).
Region-Of-Interest (ROI) Analyses
The identification of independent, unbiased ROIs was based on
two methods, which we describe below.
ROI Method I
Following Esterman et al. (2010) and Litt et al. (2010), we created
an independent, unbiased ROI using the leave-one-subject-out
approach. That is, we created an ROI in a particular region for
each subject separately by the following steps. First, for each
subject, we performed a mixed-effect analysis on the contrast of
interest using all other subjects’ data. As a result, we obtained
a statistical parametric map (SPM) of that contrast. The SPM
obtained for each subject was thus independent of that subject’s
data. We then performed the standard cluster-based statistical
inference to correct for multiple comparisons using Gaussian
random field theory (cluster-forming threshold z = 2.5, family-
wise error-corrected p < 0.05). The cluster(s) that was significant
were then used as the independent mask(s).
ROI Method II
A key question in this study was to investigate the role of sensory
systems involved in processing visual motion in the visual lottery
decision task (Session 2). This required us to perform ROI
analysis on area V5/MT+. Since we did not use a functional task
to identify area V5/MT+, we used the anatomical mask based
on an existing atlas. Here we selected the Jülich histological atlas,
which was created by averaging multi-subject post-mortem cyto-
and myelo-architectonic segmentations (Eickhoff et al., 2005)
and had been shown to have strong overlap with functionally
identified V5/MT+ (Wilms et al., 2005). We used this atlas to
create the left V5/MT+ROI and the right V5/MT+ROI.
Psycho-Physiologic Interaction (PPI) Analyses
Area V5/MT+ has been shown to represent the coherence level of
the visual motion information and critically involved in forming
a judgment of motion direction in the RDM discrimination task
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007). As such, it served as an important seed
region for our connectivity analysis. Specifically, we conducted
a PPI analysis (Friston et al., 1997) motivated by the following
question: how might the functional connectivity of V5/MT+
with the regions that represent the expected value (EV) of the
visual lotteries change during the course of a trial in the visual
lottery decision task (Session 2)?
To address this question, we used the left and right
anatomically identified V5/MT+ROIs as seed regions. For
each seed, we extracted and deconvolved its mean BOLD time
series data (Gitelman et al., 2003). The GLM had the following
regressors: (R1) The deconvolved and de-meaned seed time
course (often referred to as the physiological regressor), (R2)
Indicator function for the duration of each lottery presentation
(3 s), (R3) R2 multiplied by the EV of the currently presented
lottery, (R4) Indicator function for the duration of the delay
between L1 and L2 (1–7 s), (R5) R4 multiplied by EVL1, (R6) An
indicator function for the choice period (duration = reaction
time), (R7) R6 multiplied by EVC–EVNC, (R8) R6 multiplied
by EVL2–EVL1, (R9) Interaction between R1 and R2, (R10)
Interaction between R1 and R4, (R11) Interaction between R1
and R6. The PPI contrasts labeled as “lottery,” “delay,” and
“choice” in Figures 6B,C correspond to R9, R10, and R11,
respectively. All regressors were convolved with a canonical
gamma hemodynamic response function. Temporal derivatives





Subjects first completed the standard RDM discrimination
task (Session 1). For each subject, we separately estimated
the psychometric function that described the relation between
the probability of making a correct judgment on dot motion
direction and the motion coherence level (Britten et al.,
1992). Overall, subjects’ performance was at chance level (50%
correct) at zero coherence, and reached 90% correct or above
when coherence was 0.4 (see Figure 2A—each curve represents
the psychometric function of a single subject). Once the
psychometric function was obtained, the visual lottery pairs were
tailored for each subject separately in the subsequent visual
lottery decision task (Session 2). In Figure 2B, we plot themotion
coherence level (y-axis) that corresponds to the probabilities of
reward used in the visual lottery task (x-axis). Note that the
probability of reward is equivalent to the probability of making a
correct judgment. There were four possible reward probabilities,
[0.51 0.65 0.8 0.95] (see SectionMaterials andMethods). For each
subject, the motion coherence level corresponding to a particular
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results: RDM task (Session 1). (A) Psychometric functions in the RDM discrimination task (Session 1). Each curve represents a single subject.
(B)Motion coherence levels used in the visual lottery decision task (Session 2) are plotted against their corresponding probabilities of reward. The black dots indicate data
from individual subjects. The red dots indicate the mean of the motion coherence level averaged across subjects. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
reward probability was calculated based on his/her psychometric
function. The black dots represent individual subjects’ data, while
the red dots were the mean coherence level averaged across
subjects.
Behavioral Results: Visual Lottery Decision Task
For each subject, we performed a logistic regression analysis
by regressing choice behavior against the difference in reward
probability (1p) between the two lotteries and the difference
in reward value (1v). If a subject took into account both the
probability and reward information when making decisions,
the beta estimates for 1p (β1p) and 1v (β1v) would both be
significantly different from zero. Figures 3A,B show the results.
We found that all but one subject’s β1p was significantly >0
(one-sample t-test on each subject, p-value thresholded at 0.05)
(Figure 3B), while all subjects’ β1v were significantly >0 (p <
0.05, one-sample t-test on each subject) (Figure 3A). This
indicated that subjects made use of both probability information
and reward values in selecting lotteries. We also ran a model with
the interaction of 1p and 1v added in addition to 1p and 1v.
The beta estimates of 1p and 1v were similar to the model that
did not include the interaction term. The statistical conclusion of
β1p and β1v did not change with the interaction added to the
model. On the other hand, we found that the beta estimate of
the interaction term was not significant in 18 out of 19 subjects
(p < 0.05, one-sample t-test on each subject).
We next examined how EV influenced choice. For a lottery
(p,$v), the EV = p · v. We estimated a psychometric choice
function describing the relation between the probability of
choosing L1 and the difference between the EV of the first and
second lotteries based on the following equation
P [L1] =
1
1+ exp [− (β0 + β11EV)]
(1)
where P [L1] represents the probability of choosing L1 and
1EV = EVL1 − EVL2. Estimating this psychometric
choice function allows us to explicitly test whether subjects
exhibited significant bias toward L1 or L2 as a result of the
sequential presentations. In Figure 3C, we plot the mean choice
probabilities averaged across subjects as a function of 1EV and
the psychometric function. We found that the indifference point
(the estimate of β0) did not differ significantly from 1EV = 0
(one-sample t-test, t = −0.2, df = 18, p = 0.84), indicating
that subjects on average did not show a bias toward either L1
or L2. For each subject separately, we also estimated his or her
psychometric choice function. The results of individual subjects’
estimate of β0 are plotted in Figure 3D. The beta estimate of 14
out of 19 subjects did not differ significantly from zero (one-
sample t-test on each subject, p < 0.05), indicating no bias
toward either L1 or L2. Among the five subjects that showed a
significant bias, β0 of four subjects was significantly smaller than
zero, indicating a bias toward L2.
Neural Correlates of Valuation in the Visual
Lottery Decision Task
In the visual lottery decision task, the two lotteries in each
trial were presented sequentially. When a lottery was presented,
information about reward value and the probability of obtaining
it were revealed. As described earlier, in order to estimate the
probability of receiving the reward associated with each lottery
under consideration, subjects needed to estimate his or her own
probability of making a correct judgment based on the noisy
motion stimulus presented. This is a form of metacognition or
second-order judgment.
Table 1 summarizes the regions that correlated with reward
probability (GLM-1), reward value (GLM-1), and the EV (GLM-
2) of the visual lottery. BOLD response in lateral prefrontal,
dorsomedial prefrontal, and posterior parietal cortices correlated
with both reward probability and reward value (Figure 4A).
Statistical images were thresholded at z = 2.6 and binarized
for display purposes. Additionally, we found six clusters that
correlated with EV: the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC),
the ventral striatum (vStr), the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
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FIGURE 3 | Behavioral results: Visual lottery decision task (Session 2). (A,B) Logistic regression analysis on choice against difference in reward
value (1v) and on reward probability (1p) between the two lotteries. (A) Beta estimates of 1v separately estimated for each subject. (B) Beta estimates
of 1p separately estimated for each subject. (C) Mean frequency of choosing the first lottery (P[L1]) (averaged across subjects) as a function of the
difference in EV between L1 and L2 (1EV = EVL1 − EVL2). (D) Beta coefficient of the intercept (β0) in the logistic regression analysis on choice that
used 1EV as the regressor (Equation 1 in Results). The star symbol indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05, one-sample t-test). Error bars represent
±1 SEM.
(vlPFC), the right vlPFC, the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and
the right IPS (Figure 4B). We referred to these six regions as the
EV-coding regions.
The EV signals found in these regions represent the EV
associated with an option/good, i.e., the visual lottery. By design,
the EV of a lottery is independent of its motion direction. Hence,
the EV signals found here should not reflect the visual aspects of
the task such as the direction of dot motion. Further, subjects in
this task were asked to choose between two lotteries rather than
making a decision about motion direction. This is different from
the task the subjects perform in the standard RDM task in which
they are explicitly asked to indicate judgment of dot motion
direction. Hence, the EV signals found here should not reflect the
value associated with amotor action to indicate motion direction.
Finally, the lottery-button mapping was not revealed during the
lottery presentations. Hence, the subjects did not know what
button to press to indicate his or her lottery choice when the
lotteries were presented. The EV signals therefore cannot be tied
to a particular motor action implementing subjects’ choice.
ROI Analysis on the Robustness of EV-coding
To further examine the robustness of EV representations in
the EV-coding regions described above (dmPFC, vStr, left
vlPFC, right vlPFC, left IPS, right IPS), we performed four
additional ROI analyses on each one of them. The ROIs
were identified using ROI method I (see Section Materials
and Methods). The first analysis tested whether these regions
represented both reward probability and reward value (GLM-1).
The second analysis tested whether these regions represented EV
independent of sensory attribute of the visual lotteries, i.e., the
direction of coherent dot motion (GLM-3). The third analysis
tested whether these regions represented EV independent of
the choices the subjects made (GLM-4). The fourth analysis
tested whether these regions represented EV of both L1 and L2
(GLM-3).
The results are shown in Figure 5. For each contrast of
interest shown in the figure, the beta estimates are the mean beta
estimates averaged across subjects. Each mean beta estimate at
each ROI was tested against zero using one-sample t-test with
p-value at 0.05. First, these regions represented both reward
probability and reward value, as their beta estimates were both
significantly different from zero at each ROI (Figure 5B). Second,
the beta estimates of EV when the motion direction was upward
and when it was downward were both significantly different
from zero (Figure 5C). Third, the beta estimates of EV were
significantly different from zero when subjects chose L1 and
when they chose L2 (Figure 5D). The only exception is the left
IPS, which did not significantly correlate with EV of the lotteries
when L1 was chosen. Fourth, the beta estimates of EV for L1 and
for L2 were both significantly different from zero (Figure 5E).
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TABLE 1 | Regions in which the BOLD signal was positively correlated
with reward probability, reward value, and the expected value (EV) of the
visual lottery.




L 1970 4.3 −36 30 −6
Ventral striatum R 1499 4.4 12 12 −2
Intraparietal sulcus R 887 3.5 44 −34 46
Lateral orbitofrontal
cortex/anterior insula
R 734 4.2 32 22 −8
Dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex
L 488 3.8 −8 36 34
REWARD VALUE
Intraparietal sulcus R 1359 3.7 44 −46 46
Ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex
R 894 3.6 52 20 28
Ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex
L 628 3.6 −44 10 26
Dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex
L 596 3.7 −8 28 38
Dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex




R 1958 3.7 42 40 14
Intraparietal sulcus R 1949 4.1 42 −46 46
Ventral striatum R 1810 4.0 12 12 −2
Ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex
L 1406 4.2 −44 10 26
Dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex
L 1018 3.9 −8 28 38
Intraparietal sulcus L 781 3.5 −28 −64 34
Clusters that survived cluster-based correction (z > 2.6, family-wise error-corrected
p < 0.05 using Gaussian random field theory). The z-max column represented the MNI
coordinates of the maximum z-statistic.
Dynamic Interaction Analysis between the
EV-coding Regions and V5/MT
Convergent evidence suggests that area V5/MT+ is involved in
analyzing visual motion. V5/MT+ activity has been shown to
positively correlate with motion coherence level in the standard
RDM task (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) and to predict behavioral
performance (Newsome et al., 1989; Salzman et al., 1990).
In our whole-brain results, we did not find BOLD response
to correlate with EV in area V5/MT+ after correction for
multiple comparisons. We subsequently performed two analyses
on anatomically defined V5/MT+ (see Section ROI method II
in Materials and Methods for details). The first analysis revealed
that V5/MT+ significantly correlated with reward probability,
but not reward value. In Figure 6A, mean beta estimate (across
subjects) of reward probability (black) and reward value were
plotted separately for the left and right V5/MT+.
In the second analysis, we performed a psycho-physiologic
interaction (PPI) analysis to examine the dynamic interaction
between V5/MT+ and the six identified EV-coding regions
during the course of a trial. The results are summarized in
FIGURE 4 | Neural correlates of reward probability, reward value, and
expected value (EV) of the visual lottery. (A) Neural correlates of reward
probability (yellow), reward value (blue), and their conjunction (green).
(B) Neural correlates of EV. Regions in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC), bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), ventral striatum (vStr),
and bilateral intraparietal sulcus (IPS) correlated with the expected value of the
visual lotteries in the decision task when lottery information was revealed.
Statistical inference was based on family-wise error-corrected p-values
(p < 0.05) on cluster size (cluster-forming threshold z = 2.6) using Gaussian
random field theory.
Figures 6B,C. The value of the beta estimates (averaged across
subjects for each contrast at each ROI) shown in the figure
can be interpreted as a change in functional connectivity from
an overall baseline level. We found that functional connectivity
between V5/MT+ and EV-coding regions changed during the
course of a trial. When the visual lotteries were shown, functional
connectivity increased as evidenced by the positive mean beta
estimates. The functional coupling then decreased during the
fixation period and became significantly negative at the time of
choice response, suggesting a decrease in functional connectivity
from the baseline level. Together, these results suggest that
changes in functional coupling between these regions can take
place during the course of a single trial and that the pattern of
changes was modulated by the distinct phases within a trial.
Discussion
Many choices we make are based on uncertain visual judgments
and errors in visual judgment are potentially costly. For instance,
we strain to estimate whether anything is in our path while
driving under foggy conditions. Since information about the
probabilities of occurrence associated with different potential
outcomes is not explicitly given, the decision maker has to
estimate the probabilities determined by his or her own visual
performance, a second-order (Barthelmé and Mamassian, 2009)
or metacognitive judgment (Fleming et al., 2012b).
In this study, we investigated a simple version of this form
of decision-making. Similar to previous laboratory experiments,
subjects were asked to choose between two monetary lotteries on
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FIGURE 5 | Robustness of EV-coding. (A) Independent ROIs in six regions that correlated with expected value (EV) of the visual lottery under consideration
were created using the leave-one-subject-out approach. Because each ROI was created separately for each subject, the ROIs across subjects in one region
did not completely overlap. The blue indicated the common voxels shared across all subjects’ ROIs, while the yellow indicated the voxels that were from at
least one subject’s ROI. (B) Mean beta estimates of the reward probability (black) and reward value (white). (C) Mean beta estimates of expected value (EV) of
the visual lottery at its presentation when the correct motion direction was upward (black) or downward (white). (D) Mean beta estimates of EV of the visual
lottery at its presentation when the first lottery presented in a trial was eventually chosen (L1 chosen, black) or when the second lottery was chosen (L2
chosen, white). (E) Mean beta estimates of EV of the first visual lottery presented in a trial (L1, black) and the second lottery presented in a trial (L2, white).
The star symbol indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05, one-sample t-test for each contrast at each ROI). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
each trial. What is unique is that information about the reward
probability associated with each lottery under consideration
was not explicitly given in numerical or graphical form. Nor
was it learned through sampling. Instead, receipt of reward
depended on success in making a judgment about noisy visual
information. This requires the subjects to estimate the probability
of success given noisy information and to integrate it with
rewards that come with it in order to make good decisions. To
distinguish this type of lotteries from the more traditional form
of economic lotteries, we referred to this kind of lottery as a visual
lottery.
Neural Correlates of Valuation in the Visual
Lottery Decision Task
We examined two hypotheses for the valuation of visual
lotteries, the common-network hypothesis and the second-order
representation hypothesis.
Under the common-network hypothesis, it is assumed that no
matter how reward probability information is obtained, whether
it is explicitly given in numeric or graphical form, learned
from sampling experience, or—as in our experiment—has to be
estimated by subjects based on his or her own visual performance,
it is represented in a common valuation network that includes
the medial prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum (Bartra
et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2013). Furthermore, probability
is integrated with value information so that the network also
represents information about EV.
Evidence from the perceptual decision-making literature
and metacognition led us to the second-order representation
hypothesis, which assumes that the posterior parietal cortex
(PPC) and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) are involved in the
metacognitive (second-order) judgment that was required in our
visual lottery decisions task (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Fleming
et al., 2012b). Convergent evidence suggests that these regions
represent the accumulation and/or strength of the sensory
evidence in favor of one direction of motion over the other
in visual decision-making tasks (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Heekeren et al., 2006; Kahnt et al.,
2011; Liu and Pleskac, 2011; Filimon et al., 2013). This network
has also been shown to represent metacognitive judgments in
perceptual and memory tasks (Fleming et al., 2012a; Baird et al.,
2013).
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FIGURE 6 | ROI and connectivity analyses on area V5/MT+.
(A) Anatomically defined left and right V5/MT+ showed significant correlation
with reward probability (black) but not reward value (white) at the time when
lotteries were presented. (B,C) Psycho-physiologic interaction (PPI) analysis.
We investigated the changes in functional connectivity between a seed region
(left V5/MT+ or right V5/MT+) and the EV-coding regions (dmPFC, vStr, left
vlPFC, right vlPFC, left IPS, right IPS) at different stages during a trial: “lottery”
indicates the time where the lottery information was revealed, “delay” indicates
the fixation period between the first lottery and the second lottery, and
“choice” indicates the time where subjects made a button-press response to
indicate his or her lottery choice. The mean beta estimate of each PPI contrast
of each EV-coding region is plotted. (B) Left V5/MT+ as the seed region.
(C) Right V5/MT+ as the seed region. The star symbol indicates statistical
significance (p < 0.05, one-sample t-test for each contrast at each ROI). Error
bars represent ±1 SEM.
The common-network hypothesis and the second-order
representation hypothesis provide predictions about the network
involved in valuation of the visual lotteries. The two hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive. If the common-network hypothesis is
supported, this would strengthen the argument that information
about probability and its integration with reward value take
place in the common valuation network independent of the
decision tasks subjects have to perform: probability enters into
the valuation network without regard to its source. If the
second-order representation hypothesis is confirmed, then the
metacognitive estimates of probability are computed in the
same networks as in the much studied first-order judgments of
direction of motion in the RDM task.
We found that both hypotheses were supported by the data
as regions in the lateral prefrontal, dorsomedial prefrontal, and
posterior parietal cortices represented both reward probability
and reward value of the visual lottery. Further, we found that
activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the
ventral striatum (vStr)—part of the common valuation network,
and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (vlPFC)—part of a network involved in second-order
representation, reflected the EV of the visual lotteries when they
were presented during a trial. In separate ROI analyses, we
also found that the EV representations in these regions were
robust under different sensory attributes (motion direction),
regardless of the choices subjects made, and the order of
lottery presentation. One may argue that we cannot dissociate
representations of reward probability from motion coherence
level or confidence in making a correct judgment (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009) because both should positively correlate with
the probability of making a correct visual judgment. We
acknowledge that this is entirely possible. However, both the
coherence level and confidence should in principle not be
affected by the reward value associated with making a correct
judgment. Therefore, the neural representations of EV—the
integration of reward probability and reward value—cannot be
simply attributed to either the coherence level or confidence
alone.
The probability and EV-representations in the common
valuation network—the dmPFC and vStr—found in our study
were consistent with previous studies where probability of reward
was explicitly stated to the subjects or learned from sampling
experience (Volz et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2005; Preuschoff
et al., 2006; Berns et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2009; FitzGerald
et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011). It is worth mentioning that while
most value-based decision studies found ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) instead of dmPFC, meta-analysis results did
also find support for the involvement of dmPFC (Bartra et al.,
2013). The dmPFC shown here is in close proximity to the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), which was also shown to be
involved in valuation (Kennerley et al., 2011; Kolling et al., 2012).
The probability and EV representations found in the
second-order representation network—IPS and vlPFC—provide
new insight into the role of these regions in valuation
during decision-making under uncertainty. Most studies to
date found that value representations in these regions are
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associated with motor actions (e.g., the value associated with
making a left or right saccade; Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Kable and Glimcher, 2009). It is not clear whether they also
represent the value associated with goods in addition to the
action-value representations (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; but see
Tobler et al., 2007; Kahnt et al., 2014 for stimulus-value
representations in non-choice tasks). Since information about
the motor actions required to indicate subject’s choice was not
given to the subjects when the lotteries were presented (see
Section Materials and Methods), the robust probability and
EV representations associated with the visual lotteries under
consideration were independent of the specific motor actions
required to indicate subjects’ decisions. This demonstrates
goods-value representations in this network, in addition to
action-value representations reported in previous studies. It
also points out the possibility that goods-value representations
in IPS and vlPFC are task dependent in the sense that the
recruitment of this network in goods-value computation depends
on whether decisions requires metacognitive judgment of visual
performance.
Dynamic Interactions between Valuation
Networks and V5/MT+
Another critical finding in this study is the nature of
the functional coupling between area V5/MT+ and the
valuation networks. We found a systematic change in functional
connectivity between V5/MT+, which had been shown to
specialize in visual motion processing (e.g., Tootell et al.,
1995), and the EV-coding regions during the course of a
trial. Specifically, the functional coupling between these regions
increased when the lotteries were presented (presence of visual
motion signals) and decreased during the fixation period and
at the time of button-press response to indicate choice. Such
single-trial dynamics of functional connectivity possibly reflects
differences in the demands for visual-motion analysis between
different phases of a trial. Together with the EV-coding results,
this indicated that the strength of functional coupling between
area V5/MT+ and the EV-coding networks is critical to the
estimation of performance-based probability and its integration
with reward value in the visual lottery decision task. Interestingly,
recent results from resting-state fMRI also began to explore
the dynamics of functional connectivity between networks and
their functional implications to behavioral shifts and adaptive
processes (Allen et al., 2014). Future studies may build on
these findings to investigate, for example, whether the observed
changes in functional coupling can be attributed to the necessity
of using visual motion signals to estimate the probability of
success and hence reward probability associated the visual
lotteries under consideration. If different directions of visual
motion are arbitrarily assigned to different reward probabilities,
would the pattern of connectivity dynamics be the same as found
in this study? Understanding dynamics of functional connectivity
between these regions and testing how the pattern of dynamics
might change given different task requirements will be important
to address the mechanisms for probability computations based
on visual motion information.
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